With the end of the Cold War, a latent threat suddenly disappeared from the international stage: that of an all-out war between the two super powers, the Soviet bloc and the United States, a threat which had up to that point directed military and other strategists. A new vision that would anticipate the international scene in the years to come was essential.

Two great theses have thus become well known and have fed international debate: those of Francis Fukuyama (1989-92) and Samuel Huntington (1993-96). The two American researchers, despite their different origins, share the same belief in the superiority and uniqueness of Western civilisation, with the United States as its herald figure. The tone of the two visions is different - optimistic for the first, pessimistic for the second; they also differ in their framework and strategies. Francis Fukuyama develops a neo-liberal idea of the ideal city, the seat of democracy and human rights, resting on history, the philosophy of Hegel and economics. Samuel Huntington, on the other hand, positions his reflections in the field of geopolitical and strategic studies and draws a portrait of confrontations between the principal civilisations of the contemporary world.

Then came September 11th...if there was one moment when Huntington's predictions should come true, it should be following Osama Ben Laden's call for the destruction of the United States. Not only did the clash not occur but, quite to the contrary, an international coalition of states, including Arab and Muslim countries, actively supported the United States in the global fight against terrorism (and other forms of subversion), in a drawn-out operation of a police, not military, character. The solidarity shown by the governments of the world strongly invalidates Huntington's dark forecast.

Furthermore, Samuel Huntington's thesis on the clash of civilisations is of doubtful validity on an academic level. It can be invalidated internally, and one of the first tasks of our collective work is to deconstruct its explicit or implicit argumentation and highlight the artifices woven into it.

We cannot stop there. The fact remains that the impact of such a thesis on politics and media is striking. Well before September 11th, 2001, Huntington's ideas, their developed axiological bases and clear reasoning, had seduced the American establishment after the collapse of the communist world. The extreme generalization and simplification of the basic ideas, the emotive content of a phrase like "the clash of civilisations", and the dimension of passion that it introduced ensured the success of its discourse. It is based on beliefs and convictions that are full of fear, anguish, desire, and fantasy, hearkening back to the first ages of humanity. These ideas were conveyed by evangelical, biblical and koranic accounts, then fed by a tumultuous history: Muslim expansion, the Arab conquest of the European south and their long-term installation in Andalusia, the Crusades and the mythical dispute over Jerusalem among Jews, Muslim, and Christians, the conquest of Americas by the Spaniards, Portuguese, French and British, the Ottoman Empire, the World Wars, the wars of de-colonization, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, Khomeini's revolution in Iran, and the wars in the Arab-Persian Gulf.

Reductionist formulations like the "West" and "Islam", "Civilisation" and Barbarianism", "Them" and "Us", the "Civilised World" and "Savage Terrorism" present a black and white vision of the world and a deformed outlook, by installing two discursive paradigms: that of "Civilisation", associated with positive values of "good", "freedom", "democracy", "human rights", and that of "Savagery", representing negative values of "evil", "servitude", "oppression", and "chiefdom". These representations, largely spread by media, cultural and entertainment industries all over the world, partly serve to legitimate the saviour role of the American nation, guardian of ethical values and morals, the secular arm of the "free" or "civilised" world. This is why Huntington's thesis is so appealing for American decision makers - it flatters their superpower egos. It provides decision and opinion makers with a paradigm compatible with their prejudices, interests and concerns. This possible geopolitical map of the world, despite its errors on other levels, facilitates seeing the world in blocks, relatively vast and homogeneous, and targeting the latent oppositions and threats to American power.

On a strictly academic level, the concept of "civilisation" is problematic in its definition, its contents and its reach. Under no circumstances can a civilisation be perceived as a homogeneous unit. The concept is too general, especially in synchrony, to allow precise definition. It should be pointed out that for ethnologists, the term "civilisation" was initially associated with the genesis of the city and the birth of urbanism (Egyptian, Mayan, Aztec, Chinese civilisations…and Dogon, Pueblo, Maori cultures). Later, the meaning was extended to include its techniques and practices. Such distinctions are no longer operational, scientifically speaking.

Historically, cultural spaces can be conceptualized in their evolution and their expansion. They summarize, in their development as in their decline, the great adventure of humanity. They appear in coherent but diversified and overlapping groupings of cultures, institutions, habits and beliefs that can be called civilisations.

Let us recall Arnold Toynbee's conception of civilisations: great units make their mark on history in a broader and more durable manner than states or nations do. A civilisation can include, in diachrony or synchrony, fairly defined nations and states. It takes part, at an intermediate level, in the multicultural mixings and the intercultural interactions that it inspires, much like the universal civilisation discussed by Toynbee. Such a utopian ideal is born from the passion specific to man, which brings people together and allows them to accept each other and to live together in respect, tolerance, and dignity. This composite concept would accommodate the essential secular and religious values of man, founded in love, giving, dignity, tolerance and respect of others, all of which were recommended and glorified by religions and humanist philosophers.

Besides, the thesis of an inescapable shock of civilisations cannot be retained as a paradigm for a complex, pluralist world in perpetual transformation. The alternative assumptions must account not only for rifts produced, but also for global changes such as the European construction, the shifting of the world trade centre towards Eurasia, the assured emergence of Japan and Asian Muslim nations, the beginning of "American decline", the socio-economic changes in progress (demography, education, renewal of cultural identity, economic potential and technological innovation). All of these factors do not inevitably lead to a planetary war. They imply, undoubtedly, a repositioning on the international chessboard that would take into account the retreat of certain powers, the maintenance of others at their current level and the emergence of new forces.

This book is founded on this moderate and critical attitude, conscious of the complexity of the world and the contradictory stakes of globalization, a factor that transverses all the texts. Despite the diversity of the disciplinary fields represented (international relations, political sociology, semiotics, philosophy, social anthropology, media sociology...) and the differences of style and expression among researchers of different origins and different personalities, this common attitude gives the text its unity. The bbok is divided into four parts. The first part discusses the limited validity of Huntington's theory, its subjective character, its "West-centrism', and provides, as a contrast, the requirements that a universal theory of international relations should respect.

We must still account for the success, as far away as China, of the assumption so lengthily discussed and now invalidated. This is the task of the second and third sections. The second part of the work examines the use made of the clash on the level of collective imagination, and shows how a spectacular event can be transformed into a process of manipulation. The third part illustrates how, behind the apocalyptic portrait presented to the public, political actors can try to neutralize or exploit the expectation for the apocalypse as a means to regulate national political consensus, rather than manoeuvring for position on the international chessboard.

Rather than a conclusive alternative, this work seeks to make a modest contribution to the work of those who are concerned with the future and the conditions needed for a positive evolution. Political scientists must also remain conscious of their role as participants in the dialogue of civilisations. Does such a concern not deserve to be included in the order of the day of our next academic meetings ?

Meanwhile, until the reflection on globalization sufficiently developps, theoretical development must rely on case studies. In the cases examined hereafter, the images of the United States and the Muslim World illustrate the potential of fear and hatred that the current climate conceals. This does not suggest, of course, that the United States or the Muslim world must solely assume the responsibility for the current crisis, only that their images are negative, dramatically negative.

What will the future bring ? Without proposing a definitive answer to the question, we would like it to become a priority of the scientific agenda, to be treated under more angles than just geo-strategic studies, so narrowly focused on the security and balance of power among states. For this purpose, a fourth part of the work identifies an important dynamics that will mark the future. Its authors do not propose a single explanation or a particular future for it, only that it will not involve a clash of civilisations, because there remains only one civilisation - evidenced by identity-based tensions all over the world, including the West, and the often violent reaction to the suffering caused by its spread. This hypothesis, as surprising and shocking as it appears at first, will hold the road better that that of Huntington.

But, let us repeat, such a tendency does not lead to the end of the history. Although a significant trend, it is not fatal nor unique. Other assumptions deserve to be developed and to be compared to it. Such is the assumption that concludes the book with a note of hope: the globalization of a culture of respect and human rights is perhaps marginalized in international security agenda after September 11th, but it remains a possible solution... on the condition, we should add, that this responsibility is not left only to diplomatic circles, and that a larger group of international actors, civil or official, be involved.

At the end of the work, the reader will find the thoughts of an field expert, Wolfgang Sachsenrœder. He shows us that, for want of the clash of civilisations, tensions can only grow towards the Middle East and North Africa; furthermore, globalization of markets suggests a common future in which our strongly disadvantaged partners, 280 million Arabs (who will become 400 million in a generation), may not be easy partners. The figures provided to support this assertion are extensive, even alarming. To ease concern, Sachsenröder reminds us - echoing the conclusions of political sociology as much as the experiences of NGOs - of the spontaneous network of informal dialogue and cooperation among many actors sharing common values on both sides of the Mediterranean divide. These actors may be researchers, governmental representatives or militants - their position does not matter; the joint undertaking already exists and deserves to be encouraged. Common sense and openness belong, of course, to the realm of political action rather than scientific knowledge, which is our particular specialty. However, the refusal to choose is never neutral.

References

Fukuyama, Francis. La fin de l'Histoire et le Dernier Homme. Paris : Champs-Flammarion, 1992.
Huntington, Samuel. Le choc des civilisations. Paris : Odile Jacob, 1997.
Todd, Emmanuel. Après l'Empire. Paris : Gallimard-NRF, 2002.
Toynbee, Arnold. A Study of History. London : Oxford University Press, 12 volumes, 1934-1961.